

**Advance Policy Questions for Mr. Michael Vickers**  
**Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for**  
**Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

1. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Goldwater-Nichols has been a major success. I see no reason to modify it at this time.

**RELATIONSHIPS**

2. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

**The Secretary of Defense**

If confirmed, I will perform my duties under the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I will do my best to keep the Secretary well informed and will seek his guidance and direction and provide him with recommendations on policy matters within my purview.

**The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

If confirmed, I anticipate working very closely with the Deputy Secretary on warfighting capabilities development and force transformation, among other matters. I will ensure that the Deputy Secretary has all the information he needs regarding my responsibilities to perform these duties.

**The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

If confirmed, I will report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and seek his guidance and direction on matters pertaining to special operations, stability operations, force

transformation and resources, and strategic capabilities. I plan to provide him with regular advice and recommendations on such matters.

### **The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence**

Special operations and intelligence demand extensive mutual support; therefore, if confirmed, I intend to foster a very close relationship with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I also intend to work closely with USDI on strengthening our intelligence capabilities, including space and information operations capabilities.

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs**

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Security Affairs**

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense**

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs**

If confirmed, I expect to maintain a close working relationship with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I anticipate working very closely with the three assistant secretaries who exercise regional oversight of defense policy by providing them, along with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary, with special operations and stability operations advice pertaining to ongoing operations and operations in the planning stage. I anticipate working very closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs on several areas within ASD (GSA)'s portfolio, including force employment policy (e.g. security cooperation and contingency planning), partnership strategy, counterproliferation, and counternarcotics.

### **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

Successful policy oversight of special operations requires close coordination and collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I plan to maintain a close working relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on special operations capabilities, strategic capabilities, conventional capabilities, force transformation, and resource guidance.

### **The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs**

If confirmed, I will work with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to ensure that the requirements to organize, train, and equip Special Operations Forces are met. In addition, I will work closely with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to ensure appropriate policy oversight of their capabilities development.

### **Commander, United States Special Operations Command**

The relationship between the ASD (SO/LIC&IC) and the Commander of USSOCOM is critical. Therefore, I anticipate fostering and maintaining a close relationship with the Commander, characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and dynamic exchanges of information and ideas in order to carry out the SO/LIC mission.

### **Commander, United States Strategic Command**

If confirmed, I will have responsibility for policy oversight of U.S. Strategic Command, and I plan to forge a strong relationship with the Commander to ensure that we develop the strategic capabilities (e.g., missile defense, nuclear and conventional, global strike, information operations, and space capabilities) to meet a broad spectrum of emerging challenges.

### **Commander, United States Joint Forces Command**

If confirmed, I anticipate a close working relationship with the Commander, Joint Forces Command. Since JFCOM is the lead agent for force transformation and modernization, I will forge a strong relationship with the Command to develop the future force.

### **Commander, United States Transportation Command**

U.S. Transportation Command is a key functional command that provides global deployment and sustainability for U.S. forces. If confirmed, I will maintain a close working relationship with Commander, USTRANSCOM, to ensure that we maintain the most effective global deployment and distribution capabilities.

### **The regional combatant commanders**

The regional COCOMs are at the forefront of the war on terrorism and are responsible for maintaining a forward posture to deter and dissuade adversaries and assure our allies. If confirmed, I will work closely with the regional COCOMs to provide policy oversight for the operational employment of capabilities within the portfolio of ASD (SO/LIC&IC). I will also ensure that the views of the regional combatant commanders are taken into account with respect to capabilities requirements.

### **National Security Council**

#### **National Counter Terrorism Center**

SOF activities are central to counterterrorism; these activities are being coordinated within the larger USG counterterrorism effort through the NCTC's National Implementation Plan (NIP). If confirmed, I will maintain ASD (SO/LIC&IC)'s role as the primary OSD interface on SOF and CT matters with the NIP, continuing to coordinate and monitor OSD, Joint Staff, and Combatant Command entities whose capabilities support the NIP. SO/LIC&IC also will continue to represent DoD in the interagency on relevant matters, including participation in the Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG) and other interagency processes.

### **Central Intelligence Agency**

A close relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and Special Operations Forces is essential to counter terrorism and to conduct ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas. If confirmed, I anticipate working very closely with Director, Central Intelligence Agency, and his key subordinates. I will seek Memoranda of Agreements and Understanding

with the CIA to facilitate the effective employment of SOF and other capabilities within the ASD (SO/LIC&IC) portfolio.

### **U.S Department of State**

The Department of State is a key partner in counterterrorism and stability and reconstruction operations. If confirmed, I will work with DOS to develop effective strategies, policies, and capabilities to conduct these types of operations. I will seek Memoranda of Agreements and Understanding with the Department of State to ensure the effective employment of SOF and other capabilities within the ASD (SO/LIC&IC) portfolio. I will use DoD resources, as required and authorized, to assist the Department of State in developing its capabilities for stability and reconstruction operations. If confirmed, I anticipate working very closely with the Counselor to the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs on these matters.

### **The commanders of the service special operations commands**

If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the commanders of the service special operations component commands to ensure that they develop and provide the capabilities that the Commander, USSOCOM and the regional combatant commanders require.

## **QUALIFICATIONS**

### **3. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?**

For nearly all of the 34 years that have transpired since I enlisted in the Special Forces, I have devoted my professional life to the policy, strategy, operational and resource aspects of the duties assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC&IC). My 13 years of experience as a direct Special Forces enlistee (1970s version of the 18X program), SF non-commissioned officer, SF commissioned officer and commander of SOF operational units, and Operations Officer with the Central Intelligence Agency provided me with extensive operational experience across SOF mission areas and across a wide range of geographical and operational environments, in clandestine intelligence operations and covert action, in interagency policy formulation and execution at the U.S. mission, combatant command, sub-combatant command, sub-cabinet, cabinet, and presidential levels, in Congressional oversight of very sensitive and compartmented U.S. Government programs, and interaction with senior allied and partner foreign government officials. I have had significant operational experience across of a wide range of irregular warfare disciplines, encompassing counterterrorism, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense/counterinsurgency, and have served on both the “Black” and “White” sides of SOF. As a CIA officer, I played a key role in the Grenada rescue operation, for which I received a CIA award for valor. In the aftermath of the Beirut bombings in 1983, I was a core member of a CIA operational task force focused on identifying and retaliating against the perpetrators of the attacks. During the mid-1980s, I was the principal strategist for the largest and most successful covert action program in the CIA’s history: the successful effort to drive the Soviets out of

Afghanistan, which contributed significantly to ending the Cold War and facilitating the collapse of the Soviet empire. Since the early 1990s, I have advised the Department of Defense on force transformation, and have written about and worked extensively on the Revolution in Military Affairs, space warfare, information warfare, and the transformation of strategic warfare. I have been an advisor to the senior leadership of the Department of Defense on the Global War on Terrorism since September 12, 2001. I played a central, substantive role during the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review advising the senior leadership of the Department of Defense on the imperative of and strategies for rebalancing the warfighting capabilities of the Department for the challenges of the 21st Century. With General Wayne Downing (USA, Retired) and Major General Bill Garrison (USA, Retired), I provided the Secretary of Defense with a comprehensive assessment of Special Operations Forces and their way forward. I have advised President Bush and his war cabinet on strategy in Iraq. I have received substantial graduate education in both management and in strategic studies. I have provided extensive testimony to the Congress on the Global War on Terrorism, the Revolution in Military Affairs and force transformation. If confirmed, I believe this combined experience qualifies me to assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC&IC).

## **DUTIES**

**Section 138(b) (4) of Title 10, United States Code, describes the duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)).**

### **4. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD (SO/LIC)?**

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, the ASD (SO/LIC) is the principal special operations and low-intensity conflict official within the senior management of the Department of Defense. The ASD (SO/LIC) has as his principal duty overall supervision (to include oversight of policy and resources) of special operations and low-intensity conflict activities. These core tasks, according to USSOCOM's 2007 Posture Statement, include counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; direct action; special reconnaissance; foreign internal defense; civil affairs, information and psychological operations; and counterproliferation of WMD. Section 167 of Title 10 USC provides a very similar but not identical list of SOF activities.

### **5. Assuming you are confirmed, what changes, if any, in the duties and functions of ASD (SO/LIC) do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?**

The Secretary of Defense has reorganized his policy office. Pursuant to the reorganization, the ASD (SO/LIC) will become the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities will have, in addition to policy oversight for special operations and stability operations capabilities, policy oversight for strategic capabilities and force transformation and resources. As such, ASD (SO/LIC&IC), after the Secretary and

Deputy Secretary, will be the principal official charged with oversight over all warfighting capabilities within the senior management of the Department of Defense.

**6. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?**

As described above, given my experience in force transformation and strategic capabilities, in addition to my experience in SOF and irregular warfare, I believe that, if confirmed, I am qualified to assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC&IC).

**7. In your view, are the duties set forth in section 138(b)(4) of Title 10, United States Code, up to date, or should changes be considered?**

The duties outlined in section 138(b)(4) of Title 10 USC do not require changes at this time.

**8. What changes, if any, would you recommend?**

None at this time.

**9. What Department of Defense activities are currently encompassed by the Department's definition of special operations and low-intensity conflict?**

Special operations and low-intensity conflict activities, as defined in 10 USC Section 167, include direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other activities as may be specified by the President or Secretary of Defense. USSOCOM's nine core tasks, as noted in Question 4, are similar but not identical.

**10. If confirmed, would you exercise overall supervision of all special operations and low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense?**

Yes.

**11. In cases in which other Assistant Secretaries within the Office of the Secretary of Defense exercise supervision over some special operations and low-intensity conflict activities, what is the relationship between your office and those other offices?**

I am not aware of other Assistant Secretaries who exercise supervision over special operations and low-intensity conflict activities. I believe Title 10 USC, Section 138(b) (4) is clear on this point. If an activity pertains to special operations and low-intensity conflict, then ASD (SO/LIC&IC) supervises and provides policy and oversight, and is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on these matters. After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the ASD (SO/LIC&IC) is the principal special operations and low-intensity conflict official within the Department of Defense. I recognize, however, that, if confirmed, I would need to work closely on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters with the regional and other functional ASDs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

## **SO/LIC ORGANIZATION**

### **12. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to combating terrorism?**

Special Operations Forces are central to combating terrorism. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that SOF have clear policy guidance and sufficient capabilities and resources to carry out such missions. If confirmed, I also will work within the Department of Defense, with other government agencies, and in the interagency process to ensure that we have the most effective policies, strategies, capabilities, and operations for combating terrorism.

### **13. How would you coordinate these responsibilities with the ASD for Homeland Defense, who has responsibilities for combating terrorism in the United States?**

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as stipulated in section 902 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, will exercise principal responsibility for the overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation of resources for the Department's combating terrorism activities. If confirmed as the ASD (SO/LIC&IC), I will maintain oversight with regard to DoD's global combating terrorism activities and coordinate closely with the ASD (HD&ASA) on matters related to combating terrorism within the United States and the Western Hemisphere.

### **14. How would you coordinate these responsibilities with the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy?**

If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

### **15. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance?**

As a result of the policy reorganization, the responsibility for overseeing peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance now falls under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs. The ASD (SO/LIC&IC)'s role is to ensure that U.S. forces have the capabilities they need to participate in these types of activities and to oversee Special Operation Forces and interdependent capabilities when they participate in such activities.

## **POLICY OFFICE REORGANIZATION**

**The office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is currently being reorganized. We understand that the proposed reorganization would place the following responsibilities under the ASD (SO/LIC) in addition to responsibility for special operations, combating terrorism, and stability operations: strategic capabilities, and forces transformation and resources.**

**16. If confirmed, would these additional duties fall under your office?**

Yes.

**17. What do you believe would be the impact of placing such a broad span of issues under the ASD (SO/LIC)? Specifically, do you believe the ASD (SO/LIC) would be able to work within the letter and spirit of Section 138(b)(4) of Title 10, which states that oversight of special operations should be the ASD's "principal duty?"**

I believe that, if confirmed, I am qualified to assume the duties that would be assigned to me as ASD (SO/LIC&IC). I have significant experience in each of the areas for which I would have policy oversight, as well as significant experience in capability transformation and integration. I believe that the duties assigned to ASD (SO/LIC&IC) constitute a manageable span of control which is similar to that assigned to other ASDs. I will be assisted by a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, four DASDs and a substantial staff of directors and action officers. In previous assignments of similar scope and responsibility, I was able to accomplish the duties assigned to me with far fewer staff resources. In some key areas that fall within the ASD (SO/LIC&IC) portfolio, moreover, I will be assisted in policy oversight by other senior policy officials who have vast experience and expertise in these areas. The USDP, for example, is currently heavily engaged in missile defense negotiations, and I would expect him to continue to take a primary role in this issue area. The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) has a much larger span of control than the ASD (SO/LIC&IC) and the USDP, to my knowledge, is considered to have a manageable span of control. In addition to having oversight for all of the areas envisioned as falling under ASD (SO/LIC&IC), the USDP has oversight of global security affairs, homeland defense, and regional and global defense strategy and policy.

I believe that my recent experience in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review demonstrates convincingly that I am capable, if confirmed, of assuming the duties of ASD (SO/LIC&IC), and that the span of issues assigned to ASD (SO/LIC&IC) is not too broad. As a senior advisor to OSD for the 2006 QDR, I consulted intensively the development of new strategies and in facilitating decisions by the senior leadership of the Department to develop new capabilities and capacities in all of the areas that would be placed under ASD (SO/LIC&IC). In addition to serving as a senior advisor to the main QDR process, I was also asked to serve as Executive Director for an external QDR "Red Team" that reported directly to the Deputy Secretary. The membership of the Red Team included six retired four-star officers who collectively represented all of the Services, two regional combatant commands, Special Operations Command and the Intelligence Community. Nearly all of the Red Team's recommendations were subsequently adopted by the main QDR process and the senior leadership of the Department. I also was a core member of the team that developed the Downing Report for the Secretary of Defense, which assessed SOF policies, processes, organization, and capabilities. As was the case with the QDR Red Team report, nearly all of the recommendations of the Downing Report were subsequently adopted by the main QDR process and the senior leadership of the Department.

I believe that the duties assigned to ASD (SO/LIC&IC) pursuant to the reorganization of OUSDP will provide the Secretary of Defense with substantially improved oversight of the Department's current and future warfighting capabilities, and that special operations capabilities and stability



operations capabilities will be substantially strengthened by having a single senior defense official with oversight over all of the Department's warfighting capabilities. SOF capabilities and capacities were substantially increased as a result of the QDR, which, as described above, provided a "proof of principle" for how an ASD (SO/LIC&IC) could function within the Department. Placing policy oversight for ground general purpose capabilities for irregular warfare and conventional campaigns under one senior policy official will, in my judgment, substantially improve the oversight of OSD. A single source of policy oversight of USSTRATCOM and USSOCOM will enable more effective collaboration and coordination of strategic capabilities, specifically information operations and prompt conventional strike, that are critical to prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism.

If confirmed, I believe strongly that I will be able to work within the letter and spirit of Section 138(b)(4) of Title 10 USC, and that oversight of special operations will remain the "principal duty" of ASD (SO/LIC&IC). I will remain a member of USSOCOM's board of directors, retain oversight of Major Force Program 11, and ensure that there is no dilution of focus on special operations - on my part, as well as within the organization which, if confirmed as ASD (SO/LIC&IC), I would lead.

**18. If confirmed, under this new organization, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to strategic capabilities? What would be the major challenges in this area, and, if confirmed, how would you address them?**

If confirmed, I will assume oversight and management of issues related to strategic capabilities through oversight of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities. There are a number of challenges that fall within this portfolio. One is to ensure that the United States, its allies and friends, and its deployed forces are protected from attack by ballistic missiles, especially those that might carry weapons of mass destruction. Another is to protect U.S. interests in the global commons of space and cyberspace, particularly our freedom of action in these realms which are so critical to U.S. security. A third is to continue to address U.S. deterrence needs for the 21st century, developing and implementing a sustainable strategy to ensure that U.S. forces, including nuclear forces and conventional global strike capabilities, meet the increased range of challenges we face due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Congress and our allies to address these issues.

**19. If confirmed, under this new organization, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to forces transformation and resources? What would be the major challenges in this area, and, if confirmed, how would you address them?**

The major challenge in the forces transformation and resources area will be to facilitate the transformation of conventional capabilities, as directed by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. This will require, over time, significant rebalancing of the conventional capabilities portfolio, including both substantial investment in new capabilities and capacities as well as divestment of capabilities and capacities whose strategic effectiveness is in decline. If confirmed, I anticipate being the Department's principal policy official for forces transformation

and resources, and I would work closely with the Congress to address the major challenges in this area.

## **MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS**

- 20. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the ASD (SO/LIC)?**
- 21. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**
- 22. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the ASD (SO/LIC)?**
- 23. If confirmed, what management action and timelines would you establish to address these problems?**

The overarching challenge that will confront the ASD (SO/LIC&IC) will be to implement the direction provided in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review across all of the Department's warfighting capabilities while providing policy oversight over their employment. Rebalancing the overall Defense portfolio over time will require significant reallocation of defense resources. There are challenges specific to each issue area. Growing SOF, as prescribed in the 2006 QDR, while maintaining quality standards, will pose a significant challenge. Securing the necessary authorities with the Department of State and the CIA to facilitate the effective global employment of SOF will pose a second challenge. Rebalancing ground general purpose force capabilities toward irregular warfare while maintaining their capability to conduct conventional campaigns is a third challenge. The tension between the need to recapitalize current capabilities while transforming and expanding the force to meet future threats will pose another major challenge. Providing policy oversight for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with the omnipresent potential for strategic surprise in other areas, will pose a major challenge for senior policy officials. I do not know at this time, which, if any of these or other major challenges will pose the most serious problem for ASD (SO/LIC&IC). If confirmed, I will work closely with the Congress to develop action plans that address these major challenges and any serious problems that emerge.

## **PRIORITIES**

- 24. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD (SO/LIC)?**

If confirmed, my top priorities will be to implement the direction provided in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review across the Department's warfighting capabilities, and to provide policy oversight of special operations, conventional and strategic forces. I would seek to develop the capabilities that will be needed to win the Global War on Terrorism, shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, such as China, in ways favorable to U.S. interests, and deal with

the challenges of a more proliferated world in which both more states, as well as non-state actors, have access to weapons of mass destruction. I strongly believe that while the ASD (SO/LIC&IC) must address key capability requirements in each of area assigned to him, it is imperative that the ASD place all his attention on his top priorities.

If confirmed as ASD (SO/LIC&IC), I would likely have two overarching priorities, and two to three top priorities in each capability area. By area, my priorities will likely be to:

#### Overarching Priorities:

- Ensure that the warfighting capabilities under my oversight are used in the most effective way possible to achieve favorable outcomes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader Global War on Terrorism, and ensuring that all relevant capabilities are brought to bear to eliminate al Qaida sanctuaries in Western Pakistan and other areas
- Build a high morale, strategically effective organization in ASD (SO/LIC&IC) that is able to serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all DoD warfighting capabilities

#### SOF Priorities

- Ensure that the Department develops and expands SOF capabilities, capacities and posture without diluting quality standards, to create a Global Counterterrorism Network capable of winning the Global War on Terrorism that could principally be waged in countries with which the United States is not at war. Doing this will require bringing SOF capabilities and operations into much closer strategic and operational alignment with other government agencies
- Ensure that the Department develops the capabilities to locate, tag and track terrorists and other threats to U.S. interests and that future SOF have the capability to clandestinely infiltrate into, conduct operations within and exfiltrate from denied areas
- Achieve an appropriate balance-- in strategy, resources, and senior leader development-- between indirect and direct approaches to irregular warfare

#### Ground General Purpose Force Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations Priorities:

- Ensure that ground general purpose forces develop the required capabilities for steady-state and surge irregular warfare operations while maintaining their capabilities for conventional campaigns
- Assist the Department of State and other government agencies and departments to develop stability operations capabilities that will enable a more effective whole-of-government approach to stability and reconstruction operations

### Strategic Capabilities Priorities:

- Ensure that the Department has space and information operations policy and capabilities to meet current and future challenges
- Ensure that the Department has a prompt global strike capability to deal with the sudden emergence of extremely time-sensitive, high-value targets
- Support ongoing efforts to develop an effective missile defense system and ensure that the Department develops a robust nuclear deterrent capability to meet emerging challenges

### Conventional Capabilities and Transformation Priorities:

- Redefine force transformation to bring it into much closer alignment with anticipated future challenges and defense strategy, and ensure that the Department develops the capabilities to conduct operations in a highly proliferated world
- Ensure that sufficient resources are provided to enable the Department to field the next generation long-range strike system by 2018, that the potential for unmanned systems is fully exploited across the Department's warfighting capabilities
- Ensure that the Department develops the undersea warfare capabilities necessary to shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and hedge against the emergence of a potential near-peer competitor

## **AFGHANISTAN**

**About five years after securing a military victory against the Taliban and al 'Qaida in Afghanistan, U.S. and international forces are still fighting Taliban forces and other opponents of the Afghan government.**

**25. What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan? What are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current effort to combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan?**

I am cautiously optimistic about the current situation in Afghanistan. The Taliban regime has been removed from power; al Qaida no longer enjoys a safe haven in Afghanistan to plan and launch attacks against the United States; and Afghanistan is a democratic state. The Afghan government, with the support of the international community, is extending its reach throughout the country; the Afghan economy is growing; and more Afghans than ever before enjoy the benefits of education and health care.

Nonetheless, challenges remain. We face tenacious enemies in the Taliban, al Qaida, and other extremist groups. The United States, under Operation Enduring Freedom, leads the international

counterterrorism effort in Afghanistan. The NATO International Security Assistance Force's mandate covers security and stability. We work closely with other U.S. agencies and with our Allies and partners to execute a counterinsurgency approach that combines military operations with other critical elements such as development, capacity-building, diplomacy, and communications. The lead for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is the Afghan government. As such, the most important defense-related effort in Afghanistan is the mission to train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANA appears to be taking increasing responsibility for planning and executing operations. Our focus now is to bring the ANP to the same level.

If I am confirmed, I would be pleased to discuss our efforts in this area, including our weaknesses and shortcomings, in greater detail in a closed hearing.

**26. If confirmed, what initiatives would you take to improve the military effort to combat terrorism in Afghanistan?**

I believe that military counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, led by the U.S., are succeeding. Of course, there is always room for improvement, and I would be pleased, if confirmed, to discuss such matters in greater detail in closed session.

What is crucial now is that we build on our successes. For example, the recent capture or death of senior Taliban and al Qaida commanders, especially Dadullah Lang, is a significant blow against the enemy.

In addition to maintaining pressure on these groups and individuals, it is critical that we work with Pakistan and Afghanistan to expand cooperation and strengthen existing mechanisms for intelligence-sharing, military-to-military dialogue, and political discourse, and support Pakistan's efforts to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries in West Pakistan.

**27. In your view, what is the appropriate role of Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, and the proper relationship between direct action and counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations there?**

Special Operations Forces, direct action and counterterrorism play key roles in Afghanistan, but they are only one part of our overall effort.

We work closely with other government agencies and with our allies and partners to help the Afghan government execute a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach that combines military operations with other critical elements such as development, capacity-building, good governance, and communications.

## **TRANSFORMATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

**Much attention has been focused on the transformation of our conventional Armed Forces to make them more capable of conducting counterinsurgency and combating terrorism missions.**

### **28. Do you believe that our Special Operations Forces (SOF) need to be transformed?**

Yes. We are in a long irregular war that requires U.S. Armed Forces to increasingly adopt indirect, unconventional and clandestine approaches. To that end, I strongly support the 2006 QDR recommendation to increase SOF capabilities and capacities to perform more demanding and specialized tasks to defeat terrorists and other irregular challenges, while providing substantially increased global presence. Increasing SOF capabilities and capacities also broadens and deepens available U.S. strategic options for dealing with hostile states. I believe that the 2006 QDR provides an appropriate vision and strategy for the transformation of SOF.

### **29. If so, what is your vision for such a transformation, and how would the transformation of conventional forces complement a SOF transformation, and vice versa?**

Expanding the capability and capacity of SOF to take on the more demanding and specialized tasks will require the ability to:

- Conduct long-duration, indirect and clandestine operations in politically sensitive environments and denied areas;
- Locate, tag, and track dangerous individuals and other high-value targets globally; and
- Detect, locate, and render safe WMD.

As the 2006 QDR recommended, we need to increase both SOF and conventional force capability and capacity to conduct and sustain long-duration irregular operations.

- For surge scenarios, the conventional force should become as proficient in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations as it is in high-intensity combat.
- For steady-state operations, the conventional force should possess the ability to train, mentor, and advise foreign security forces.

Additionally, expanding the capability and capacity of conventional forces through exploitation of the Revolution in Military Affairs, will, as demonstrated in Operation Enduring Freedom, substantially increase the effectiveness of unconventional warfare and special operations.

My vision for transforming Special Operations Forces, conventional forces and strategic forces is resident in the priorities (outlined in the answer to 24, above) I would likely have, if confirmed, as ASD (SO/LIC&IC). My vision is very closely aligned with the transformation vision outlined in the 2006 QDR. My vision is described more fully in my recent testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on SOF and the GWOT, in several publications and reports I have authored or co-authored while with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and in numerous public speeches I have given on the topic. I have provided the Committee with several samples of each, and would be pleased to discuss my vision in greater depth at the Committee's request.

**30. Specifically, what do you believe transformation should mean for the special operations community in terms of missions, training, equipment, or in any other aspect?**

SOF transformation should be focused on the capabilities, capacities and posture required to win the Global War on Terrorism, and on the capabilities and capacities required to conduct unconventional warfare and SOF-intensive operations against hostile states, including those who possess advanced anti-access capabilities. With respect to the GWOT, SOF transformation should result in capabilities and capacities to plan and synchronize the GWOT and conduct persistent, low visibility indirect and clandestine operations in scores of countries (with which the United States is not at war) simultaneously. SOF transformation for the GWOT should substantially improve SOF's ability to operate in denied areas, to locate, tag and track terrorists and other high-value targets and threats, and to render safe multiple nuclear weapons simultaneously. SOF transformation for operations against hostile states should focus on the capabilities required to penetrate and operate in denied areas, and to exploit the full potential of the Revolution in Military Affairs. The development of SOF and GWOT strategists and senior leaders should also be a top transformation priority. Additional details on SOF transformation are contained in my testimony on SOF and the GWOT before the House Armed Services Committee.

Over the past three decades, as strategic circumstances have changed, SOF has been required to take on new missions, such as counterterrorism, information operations, and counterproliferation of WMD. The only changes in missions currently envisioned that would result from SOF and general purpose force transformation would be to divest certain areas to the GPF, freeing up SOF to do more of the unique missions for which they are specially trained, organized and equipped (e.g., UW, CT). The ongoing transformation of both the strategic environment and SOF capabilities, however, will undoubtedly require SOF to take on new, as of yet unforeseen, missions in the future. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this discussion with the Committee.

**31. Are the Special Operations Command and the Department of Defense investing in the technologies to transform SOF according to the vision you describe?**

Yes. USSOCOM and the Department are investing in key technologies to transform SOF. USSOCOM has a strong technology development program designed to deliver key capabilities to the SOF warrior in the shortest time possible. In addition, the ASD (SO/LIC&IC) is responsible for managing and providing technical oversight of the Combating Terrorism Technology Support program. This program supports many organizations, including USSOCOM, to conduct rapid prototyping for combating terrorism technologies. For the longer term, a new Capabilities Based Assessment for Irregular Warfare is underway in the Department which will help identify key capability gaps in irregular warfare. Identifying these gaps will help the Department focus technology development in new areas to the greatest benefit. Over time, however, substantial additional resources will almost certainly be needed if USSOCOM is to fully realize my vision for transforming SOF.

**32. What, if any, special role can SOCOM's development and acquisition capability play in Service and Department of Defense efforts?**

USSOCOM has its own development and acquisition program for SOF-unique capabilities. The Command also participates in Service-common development and acquisition. For these service-common development and acquisition programs, USSOCOM has a special role including its unique capability needs in larger service programs. USSOCOM frequently takes a service common item and modifies it for SOF-specific needs, which results in significant savings. This acquisition operating practice, however, may become more problematic in the future if, as anticipated, the platform needs of SOF and the general purpose forces diverge significantly. For example, maintaining a long-range clandestine air mobility capability for SOF after the Combat Talon and other non-stealthy aircraft are no longer capable of penetrating into denied airspace is a looming challenge that may require additional resources to USSOCOM. Ensuring that USSOCOM requirements are met by Service and Department acquisition programs or by the provision of sufficient resources and program management capabilities to develop SOF-unique platforms is a core responsibility of ASD (SO/LIC&IC). Conversely, as general purpose forces become more involved in irregular warfare, capabilities that were once SOF-unique could become increasingly available to general purpose forces.

**CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

**The 1986 Special Operations legislation assigned extraordinary authority to the Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), to conduct some of the functions of both a military service and a unified combat command.**

**33. Which civilian officials in the Department of Defense exercise civilian oversight of the "service-like" authorities of the Commander, USSOCOM?**

Per 10 USC and DoD Directive 5111.10 (in accordance with USD (P) priorities and guidance), the ASD SO/LIC&IC is the principal civilian oversight for all SOF matters. Other DoD civilian officials also exercise oversight in some capacity.

- USD (AT&L) coordinates on acquisition issues
- USD (P&R) coordinates on personnel policies such as SOF unique incentive packages
- USD (Comptroller) coordinates on SOF budget and year of execution program issues
- Service Secretaries coordinate on SOF manpower issues
- Director, PA&E, coordinates on SOF Program development and issues.

**34. In your view, what organizational relationship should exist between the ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM?**

ASD (SO/LIC) provides civilian oversight of all special operations matters as required by 10 USC. As such, ASD (SO/LIC) provides policy and resource guidance and advice to implement



Secretary of Defense and USD (P) priorities. ASD (SO/LIC) is a voting member of USSOCOM's Board of Directors for Program guidance and decisions. The relationship with Commander, USSOCOM should be collaborative and cooperative to ensure that we develop the best possible forces and employ them effectively.

**35. What should be the role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in preparation and review of Major Force Program 11 and the Command's Program Objective Memorandum?**

The ASD (SO/LIC) provides policy oversight of the preparation and justification of the Special Operations Forces' program and budget. The ASD co-chairs the USSOCOM Board of Directors -- the USSOCOM resource decision forum. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure that USSOCOM funding sustains a ready, capable force, to meet this new era's challenges.

**36. What is the appropriate role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in the research and development and procurement functions of the SOCOM?**

The appropriate role of ASD (SO/LIC) is to provide policy oversight in resolving special operations acquisition issues. As the lead OSD official for SOF acquisition matters, ASD (SO/LIC) represents SOF acquisition interests within DOD and before the Congress. The responsibilities and relationships between ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM are defined and described in a Memorandum of Agreement between the ASD and Commander, USSOCOM. The ASD directs and provides policy oversight to technology development programs that address priority mission areas to meet other Departmental, interagency, and international capability needs (e.g. the Technical Support Working Group).

**37. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the operational planning of missions that involve Special Operations Forces, whether the supported command is SOCOM or a geographic command?**

ASD (SO/LIC) serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all aspects of employment, deployment, and oversight of Special Operations and counterterrorism capabilities. SO/LIC provides policy oversight of the mission planning for USSOCOM and Geographic Combatant Commanders in the employment of SOF to ensure compliance with public law and DoD priorities. ASD (SO/LIC) coordinates deployment authorities and plans involving SOF within DoD and with interagency partners as required.

## **EXPANDED ROLES OF UNITED STATES SOCOM**

**USSOCOM has additional, expanded responsibilities in the global war on terrorism, as a supported combatant commander, in addition to its more traditional role as a supporting combatant commander.**

**38. What role should ASD, (SO/LIC) play in the oversight and planning of such missions?**

USSOCOM should continue to exercise responsibility as the lead planner and synchronizer for the Global War on Terrorism. As USSOCOM develops campaign plans in coordination with geographic COCOMs and Combat Support Agencies, the ASD (SO/LIC&IC) should maintain oversight of such planning and should develop concepts and initiatives for the employment of SOF and coordinate or obtain the authorities required within DoD, in the interagency and by the Congress. ASD (SO/LIC&IC) is responsible for ensuring that the requisite policies, authorities, capabilities and resources are sufficient for execution of the plans and operations for which USSOCOM is responsible. ASD (SO/LIC&IC) should also ensure that an appropriate balance is achieved between indirect and direct approaches and capabilities in USSOCOM plans, operations, command structure and resource allocation decisions.

**39. In your view, what types of missions should SOCOM conduct as a supported combatant command?**

USSOCOM's role should be, in accordance with the Unified Command Plan, the supported commander for planning and synchronization of the Global War on Terrorism. Actual mission execution in most instances would still be conducted by Geographic Combatant Commanders, or, more precisely, in accordance with Title 10 USC section 167: a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.

Only in rare instances, involving highly sensitive targets or significant political considerations, would Commander USSOCOM execute a mission; specifically, he shall exercise command of a selected special operations mission if directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

**40. In your view, how are intelligence activities different from other SOCOM activities?**

USSOCOM's primary activities are directed at the operational and tactical level, using intelligence to directly facilitate the conduct of everyday mission sets covering the nine Special Operations Core Tasks. Since they are not directed by the Director of National Intelligence for the purpose of collecting or producing strategic intelligence, these activities fall outside of the consolidated national intelligence program. Some compartmented intelligence activities conducted by USSOCOM elements are funded under intelligence programs and operate under different authorities.

## **SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

**The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for increases in the size of Special Operations Forces.**

- 41. Do you believe that we should increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much? If confirmed, would you consider greater increases than those envisioned in the QDR?**

Yes, I strongly believe it is imperative to increase the number of special operations personnel as prescribed in the 2006 QDR. SOF growth is a core aspect of SOF transformation. Only with this growth, will USSOCOM be able to realize the steady-state posture that will likely be necessary to win the Global War on Terrorism. I believe that the SOF growth prescribed in the 2006 QDR is sufficient, but, if I am confirmed, and I determine at some point that additional SOF growth is required, I will consult with the Congress. The most likely area for further growth in SOF capacity is in air capabilities.

- 42. In your view, how can the size of Special Operations Forces be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?**

The 2006 QDR and the Downing Report focused significant attention on strategies for growing SOF, while assuring that high quality is maintained. This included ensuring that sufficient resources are devoted to the institutional training base to accommodate substantially increased throughput; exploiting the potential of direct entry enlistment into Special Forces via the 18X program; ensuring that Ranger units, who, in addition to providing critical capabilities, also serve as a core recruiting base for Special Forces and Special Mission Unit personnel, are grown in proportion to the desired increase in those units; and redesigning training programs to achieve greater yield while maintaining quality. The Department's classified Special Mission Units, which are among the most difficult parts of the force to grow, given their very low selection yield and the extensive training and experience that is required to produce a successful operator, have grown substantially since their inception, despite doubts that it could be done, and are prescribed to grow substantially more as we continue to shift from a reactive to a proactive CT force. SMU growth has been accomplished without substantial dilution of quality.

To achieve the SOF growth prescribed by the QDR and develop and maintain the intelligence capabilities and ability to operate in politically sensitive and denied areas that we require for the GWOT, we must find innovative ways to retain experienced SOF. The decline in the experience level of the force must be reversed. This is challenge that SOF has in common with the National Clandestine Service, which is also expanding its ranks substantially, and, as a consequence, is seeing its experience levels decline. If confirmed, I will work with the Congress, USSOCOM, the Services, and others in DoD to achieve the SOF growth objectives of the 2006 QDR while maintaining the high standards expected of SOF.

## **STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

### **43. What is your definition of strategic communications and information operations, and what is the relationship between them?**

Strategic communications are focused U.S. Government communication processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences. The goal is to create, strengthen, or preserve favorable conditions to advance national interests. Strategic communications is an overt instrument.

Information operations are the integrated employment of various techniques, including computer network operations, to influence or disrupt adversarial decision making, capabilities and operations while protecting our own. Information operations can be overt or covert. If confirmed I will assess these issues and be happy to discuss them in more detail in a closed session.

Information operations and strategic communications must be complementary and coordinated.

### **44. What role do you envision for SOCOM in overall U.S. strategic communications and in U.S. information operations?**

I see USSOCOM playing a vital role in implementing strategic communication plans and supporting the Geographic Combatant Commanders' efforts to counter violent extremists around the world. USSOCOM also provides information operations capabilities, which if confirmed, I will be happy to discuss in more detail in a closed session.

### **45. Under what circumstances would the Commander, SOCOM, conduct information operations as a supported combatant commander?**

As the supported COCOM for planning and synchronizing the GWOT, USSOCOM guides collaborative planning, coordination, and when directed, execution of information operations. I can envision USSOCOM leading the execution of information operations to support surgical, limited duration, counterterrorism and other IW missions.

## **MARINE CORPS SPECIAL OPERATORS**

### **46. What do you believe should be the appropriate relationship between the Marine Corps and SOCOM?**

I believe that USSOCOM should develop a relationship with the Marine Corps similar to the relationship that it has with the Army, Air Force, and Navy.

USSOCOM, in collaboration with ASD (SO/LIC&IC), should work closely with the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps to coordinate the 10 USC "Service like" responsibilities of USSOCOM for the Marine Corps component.

**47. Do you believe that Marines should be “SOF for life,” just as Army special operations forces are?**

I do not believe we have had enough experience yet with the Marine Corps component of SOF to fully answer this question, but the Department’s experience with SOF from the other Services certainly suggests that there should be a strong bias towards “SOF for life.” The Marine Corps are organized differently than Special Forces but they share some of the same missions. Unlike Special Forces, however, there is not a SOF unique military specialty for the Marine Component, at least not at this time. Current assignment policies for the Marine Corps component envisions that individuals will rotate between SOF and regular Marine Corps assignments. If confirmed, this is an issue that I will examine closely in collaboration with the Marine Corps and USSOCOM.

**48. What can be done to improve the training of Marines in the Marine Corps special operations units to ensure that they possess the language capabilities and cultural awareness that are needed for counterterrorism and training missions?**

The Marine Corps already is leading the other services in providing regional and cultural expertise to their active force. In addition, the Marines make available web-based training, distance learning and other tools, putting them in a strong starting position to meet the language capability and cultural awareness demands of special operations missions. If confirmed, I will take a close look at what the Marine Corps has done and see how their efforts can be expanded and how the other Services, and USSOCOM, can employ their learning tools.

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS**

**49. What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?**

I am aware that, as a follow-up to the 2006 QDR, the Department is assessing the capability and capacity of the general-purpose forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations and train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign security forces. This is one candidate area for limited SOF divestment. A GPF capability to train, equip and advise large numbers of foreign security forces could allow SOF to focus on more SOF-unique and critical missions. SOF must maintain a very robust train, equip, and advise foreign security forces capability, however, to conduct operations in politically-sensitive environments, to ensure SOF access for other SOF activities, and to train, equip and advise irregular forces. The proper balance between SOF and GPF in counterinsurgency operations is very much situation-dependent.

**50. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?**

I do not currently foresee any additional missions that USSOCOM should assume. I believe however, that SOF-led approaches to counterinsurgency are worth exploring. Counterinsurgency operations conducted by the United States will, more often than not, be conducted indirectly.

SOF, and in particular its SF units, specialize in the indirect approach. I believe that employing unconventional warfare against non-state actors holds considerable promise as an expanded USSOCOM mission area. This approach could allow SOF to access areas which would otherwise be denied. I believe that clandestine intelligence operations are an area of possible mission growth for SOF. The Global War on Terrorism has placed a premium on developing “ruggedized” case officers, which SOF and USSOCOM are well equipped to provide. I strongly believe, however, covert action should remain the sole responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency. If confirmed, I look forward to discussing this issue in greater depth in a closed session with the Committee.

**51. What can be done to ensure that SOF missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis and appropriate funding as direct action?**

Counterterrorist capabilities, both proactive and reactive, counterproliferation of WMD capabilities, and clandestine operations capabilities represent a critical national asset, and must be resourced accordingly. USSOCOM’s indirect capabilities, however, are increasingly central to the Global War on Terrorism. While the resources devoted to USSOCOM’s indirect capabilities have increased substantially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this part of the portfolio remains significantly under-resourced. Indirect capabilities are under-resourced, in my judgment, at both the Service and USSOCOM levels. Resourcing USSOCOM’s direct and indirect capabilities should not, however, be a zero-sum game. While resources devoted to USSOCOM’s indirect capabilities should be significantly increased, resources should not simply be shifted from direct side to the indirect. USSOCOM’s direct capabilities benefit immensely in the allocation of resources from their designation as special mission units, and their inclusion in a national mission force, sub-unified command. Owing to their critical importance and command advantage, USSOCOM’s direct capabilities also produce the preponderance of SOF officers selected for high command. This could lead to an imbalance in strategy. I do not believe, however, that there is such an imbalance currently. The dominant approach in the Global War on Terrorism is indirect, and this is recognized by USSOCOM. The Commander, USSOCOM, moreover, has also recently selected an officer who specializes in the indirect approach to become USSOCOM’s new Director of the Center for Special Operations.

Assuring a proper balance between direct and indirect capabilities will require additional resources devoted to indirect side, and some believe the creation of new organizational and command arrangements as well. An increase in resources could be facilitated by having the Services designate at least some of USSOCOM’s indirect capabilities as top priority special mission units on par with special mission units that specialize in direct capabilities. Some believe the command imbalance could be addressed by creating an equivalent three-star indirect operational command – a Joint Unconventional Warfare Command. Under this proposal, indirect capabilities from across USSOCOM’s service components could be operationally assigned to this new command. This would give USSOCOM and the GCCs two operational component commands instead of just one, with the Center for Special Operations and the Theater Special Operations Command functioning as integrated planners and synchronizers and force employers. This could increase the likelihood that SOF officers who specialize in the indirect approach would have as equal a shot at high command as their direct action counterparts.

SOF manpower, however, is a scarce resource. Creating new headquarters should be done only if absolutely necessary, and then in the most efficient manner possible. One approach that would meet at least the latter criterion would be to convert an existing service force provider headquarters into a provisional JUWC. Those who favor this approach suggest that the Army's Special Forces Command could be a candidate for this role.

I believe the ideas described above merit further study. If confirmed, I will work with the Commander, USSOCOM and the senior defense civilian leadership to achieve an appropriate balance between indirect and direct capabilities.

## **FUTURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS**

**Many believe that the principal threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century will be asymmetric, unconventional ones, often emanating from non-state actors.**

**52. Since asymmetric, unconventional threats must now be confronted by our conventional forces, what is the future role of special operations? What special threats must SOCOM be focused on for the future?**

Irregular warfare will likely be the dominant form of conflict for the foreseeable future. Both SOF and conventional forces must place increased emphasis on it. Conventional forces--rebalanced toward greater IW capabilities -- and SOF are complementary capabilities, not competitive.

Expanding the capability and capacity of conventional forces for certain IW missions (e.g., COIN, Stability Operations, and FID) will free up SOF to take on the more demanding and specialized tasks, including:

- Long-duration, indirect and clandestine operations in politically sensitive environments and denied areas;
- Locate, tag, and track dangerous individuals and other high-value targets globally; and
- Detect, locate, and render safe WMD.

These are core missions in the GWOT. Additionally, SOF must remain prepared to conduct unconventional warfare against hostile states, and increase its capabilities to conduct SOF-intensive operations in anti-access environments.

## **LESSONS LEARNED**

**53. In your view, what have been the most significant lessons learned by special operations forces in recent military operations, and what are the future operational, research and development, and procurement implications of these lessons?**

Operation Enduring Freedom revealed the power of unconventional warfare when supported by precision airpower. A clear implication of OEF is that national leadership now has an

increasingly viable indirect, small ground footprint option to decisively defeat a hostile regime. Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines has shown the power of an indirect approach to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism as well. One implication of OEF-P is that SOF-led counterinsurgency concepts merit further study.

Proactive CT operations have shown that rapidly exploiting intelligence to identify and strike new targets significantly increases the odds of operational success. These operations also have shown that persistent ISR is vital to success.

## **DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES**

### **54. If confirmed, how would you ensure that Special Operations capabilities are integrated into overall Department of Defense research and technology development programs?**

If confirmed, I would work closely with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) toward this end. DDR&E publishes a Strategic Plan that guides investment and management priorities for collective research and development programs. This plan helps focus Department-wide science and technology priorities, and I would work to include SOF capabilities and needs into those priorities. I would also focus on leveraging department-wide technology developments.

## **LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AWARENESS CAPABILITIES**

### **55. In your opinion, what is the role of technology in the development of on-demand language and cultural awareness capabilities for deployed special operators?**

Technology has a valuable role in providing these capabilities to our special operators. For example, we have developed technological solutions that allow us to provide on-demand and reach-back translation capabilities to our deployed forces. However, there is no substitute for the expertise derived from personal interaction with those who speak the language. Language and cultural immersion programs are an important aspect of developing and maintaining language and cultural capabilities.

### **56. How should SOCOM address the erosion of language and cultural deficiencies caused by the disproportionate deployment of specialized operators to Iraq and Afghanistan?**

Iraq and Afghanistan, undoubtedly, have created a challenge for us to retain our language and cultural expertise in other areas.

We can mitigate at least partially the impact of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan by leveraging the web-based training, distance learning, and Mobile Training Teams from the



Defense Language Institute as well as our internal special operation language and cultural training capabilities.

## **COUNTERDRUG/COUNTERTERRORISM MISSIONS**

**Special Operations Forces have been deeply involved in training forces in Colombia to conduct unified counterdrug - counterterrorism missions.**

**57. In your view, what has been the success of training missions in Colombia?**

From my understanding, Colombia is safer today than in the late 1990's; kidnappings, homicides, and massacres are at the lowest levels in almost twenty years. By most indicators of military readiness, Colombia's military is also better today than at any other time in recent memory. Our training has helped produce a more professional and capable corps; they are better motivated and more conscious of their obligations to respect human rights.

**58. Are these appropriate missions for U.S. Special Operations Forces?**

Yes. It is my understanding that SOF is making a major contribution to the success of Plan Colombia.

**59. What, if any, benefit do unified counterdrug-counterterrorist training missions in Colombia and counterdrug training missions worldwide provide to Special Operations Forces?**

In addition to the positive impact upon U.S. Government counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts, SOF counterdrug and counterterrorism training missions in Colombia and throughout the world provide excellent opportunities for SOF to work with security and military forces of partner nations. These missions strengthen SOF skills such as instructor skills, language proficiency, and cultural immersion in real-world settings. They also facilitate the development of important professional and personal relationships that strengthen U.S. access. At the operational level, integrated CN and CT operations are complex contingencies that foster the development of SOF strategists.

## **STABILITY OPERATIONS**

**The office of ASD (SO/LIC) is responsible for policy and activities concerning stability operations, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.**

**60. To your knowledge, what is the current involvement of the office of the ASD (SO/LIC) in the planning and conduct of stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq?**

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs have the lead within Policy for planning and conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. If confirmed, I will be the principal advisor on special operations and low-intensity conflict, and therefore, will work closely with my regional counterparts to ensure appropriate oversight of any operations in which SOF are employed. It is my aim, if confirmed, to significantly increase the contribution of OSD's capability experts in policy, strategy and operations. I believe that regional-functional operational collaboration can produce vastly improved policy oversight. I also will work to ensure that U.S. forces have the capabilities and capacity to conduct stability operations in general; to assess feedback from operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere to identify "lessons learned;" and to use that feedback to improve our future ability to conduct stability operations.

I understand that SO/LIC is currently working to improve coordination with interagency partners to help ensure greater effectiveness of the U.S. Government in planning and conducting stability operations. If confirmed, I plan to continue our efforts in this area.

**61. Who has the principal responsibility within the Department for the planning and conduct of stability operations in these nations?**

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy supervises the planning and conduct of stability operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, providing policy-level oversight and coordination. The Joint Staff, in particular the Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policies (J-5), also plays a critical role in developing plans and operational guidance for the relevant combatant commands. Within SO/LIC, the Stability Operations Capabilities office supports relevant offices in Policy, including the regional desks and the Offices of Coalition Affairs and Partnership Strategy, as subject-matter experts on stability operations and by facilitating interagency coordination with respect to stability operations-related issues.

**62. If confirmed, what role would you play in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future stability operations? What are the major challenges in this area and how would you address them?**

Under the Policy reorganization, the ASD (SO/LIC&IC) is responsible for planning for stability operations, and developing capabilities to conduct them. Among the major challenges that need to be addressed are how to transition from the direct to the indirect approach, and how to improve our ability to produce capable and reliable foreign police forces. If confirmed, I would develop plans to address these and other challenges in coordination with the regional ASDs.

## **PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS**

**Psychological operations (PSYOPS) and civil affairs have played prominent roles in recent military operations, from the Balkans to Afghanistan to Iraq. Most U.S. PSYOPS and Civil Affairs units and capabilities are in our reserve components.**

**63. What role does the ASD (SO/LIC) have in providing oversight for PSYOPS and civil affairs missions?**

As the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for DoD PSYOPS and Civil Affairs, ASD (SO/LIC&IC) provides oversight of PSYOPS and Civil Affairs policy and planning. ASD (SO/LIC&IC) reviews all request for forces for PSYOPS/CA assets and makes recommendations through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Combatant Command authority for U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and USSOCOM PSYOPS and Civil Affairs assets are split between U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command. If confirmed, I will have policy oversight of both USSOCOM and USJFCOM, which will allow me to identify policy and programming actions to better support ongoing operations in these areas.

**64. In your view, do the Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and other assets to conduct the range of PSYOPS and civil affairs missions being asked of them?**

DoD is in the process of expanding Civil Affairs and PSYOP structure in both the active and reserve components of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. I also understand that the Joint Staff will conduct an analysis of CA/PSYOP shortfalls within a study of irregular warfare in time for the next POM. If confirmed, I also will review the Civil Affairs and PSYOP structure and work with the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commands to determine the shortfalls and how best to address them.

**65. In your view, is the planned mix of active and reserve components adequate in these areas?**

No. I believe that we need a larger active-duty Civil Affairs force. This will allow the reserve force to focus more directly on providing functional specialists (Government, Economics, and Public Facilities) that leverage the civilian skills within our reserve components.

**66. What is the current and future impact on the training, equipping, and promotion and individual assignments of Civil Affairs reservists?**

Our reserve Civil Affairs force is under considerable stress. The Army's active CA component will focus on support for Special Operations, while the Army's reserve component will focus on support to conventional operations. I understand that the Army is reviewing the impact of the growth of Civil Affairs on the training pipeline and that USN and USMC are collaborating on their respective CA training requirements. I do not know what the impact will be regarding the assignments of CA reservists, but if confirmed, I will give attention to this issue as we review how to develop adequate Civil Affairs capabilities to meet future challenges.

## **TRAINING CAPABILITY**

**The ability of special forces personnel to train realistically is of vital importance.**

**67. What capabilities do you consider most important for effective training of special forces personnel?**

Extended and advanced training is central to special operations proficiency. Some SOF personnel, for example, require constant advanced training, made possible only by real world exercises and very sophisticated facilities, and access to the most advanced training programs.

The most challenging task for SF personnel to perform is unconventional warfare. Cultural and societal knowledge and language and interpersonal skills are essential. Personalized learning integrated into other SF training, immersion programs, and distance learning tools are important, but language proficiency remains a very challenging area for SF. Nothing replaces the fluency gained from extended operational experience in a foreign language environment. Some UW operations require advanced special operations training. Being able to conduct UW at the operational level of war is increasingly imperative, and improving our capabilities in this area will require advanced SOF education. Maintaining SF combat skills requires significant resources. Since UW is one of the hardest tasks to simulate, significant operational experience is usually required to gain mastery. Valuable UW experience might be gained by increasing the number of SOF personnel who are detailed to other government agencies.

**68. What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance training for special operations personnel?**

Language proficiency is an area of particular concern. Improving SOF proficiency will require substantial classroom instruction but, more importantly, also regional immersion training. Immersion training could be acquired by embedding Officers and NCOs in foreign military organizations.

A more robust program to train and educate SOF strategists should also be studied.

**69. What, if any, training benefits accrue to U.S. Special Operations Forces from training foreign military personnel?**

SOF personnel gain long-term benefits from working with and building relations with the foreign military personnel that they train. Such activities augment SOF's language capabilities and cultural awareness. By training foreign forces, U.S. SOF personnel also learn their doctrine, tactics, and operating procedures.

## **TRAINING AND EQUIPPING INDIGENOUS FORCES FIGHTING WITH SOF**

**In Section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress gave SOCOM a two-year authority to train and equip indigenous forces fighting alongside U.S. special operators. This year the Department is seeking a reauthorization.**

- 70. How has SOCOM used this authority, and to what effect? If confirmed, how and where would you use this authority?**

It is my understanding that USSOCOM has obligated funds to train and equip foreign or irregular forces, groups and individuals engaged in supporting ongoing operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces. The agility to apply resources provided by this authority has had a meaningful effect on recent operations by allowing the Command to fund activities in all five Geographic Commanders' areas of responsibility – activities that otherwise would likely have remained unfunded. If confirmed, in addition to continuing current efforts, I would encourage the COCOMs to use this tool to expand their UW activities against hostile non-state actor targets.

## **ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM (ASDS)**

**To date, about \$885 million has been spent on developing the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS). The Fiscal Year 2008 request for ASDS is \$10.6 million for procurement and \$20.3 million for research and development.**

- 71. In your view, can SOCOM afford to have more than one ASDS? How long will it take to ensure that there is an operational ASDS?**

It is my understanding that ASDS is available for limited operations and select taskings now. The ASDS will provide an important denied-area maritime clandestine infiltration and exfiltration capability. If confirmed, I will work closely with USSOCOM to determine the number of ASDS hulls required.

## **TREATMENT OF DETAINEES**

- 72. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?**

Yes. I believe that as a matter of policy, the Department was already in compliance with the requirements of Common Article 3, and that the Deputy Secretary's memo was sent to ensure that as a matter of law, all DoD components understood that Common Article 3 was the standard following the Supreme Court's decision in *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*.

- 73. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?**
- 74. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?**

Yes. I support the standards and believe that they incorporate the lessons learned in prior conflicts as well as have adapted to the enemies we face in the War on Terrorism. I understand the Congress was fully briefed as to the new interrogation procedures. The military intelligence community has stated that they believe that the procedures outlined in FM 2-22.3, including Common Article 3 treatment, provide the military with the best method for extracting timely operational intelligence.

- 75. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?**

If confirmed as the ASD (SO/LIC&IC), I will not have direct responsibility for the implementation of detainee operations policy. The office of Detainee Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Detainee Affairs, fall under the ASD (Global Security Affairs), a position that is currently vacant. The acting, Mr. Benkert, has responsibility within policy for the Office of Detainee Affairs. The Office of Detainee Affairs is important in this question as it is the office primarily charged with development of policy and conducting policy oversight on detainee matters, per the DoD Directive, and Secretary Rumsfeld's July 2006 memorandum.

To the extent that my responsibilities for special operations involve detention operations, I will ensure that our policies and procedures are closely coordinated with broader detainee policy. I also will ensure that guidance that we develop on detainee issues is consistent with broader detention policies.

**The Department of Defense Inspector General recently released a report on detainee abuse noting reports of detainee abuse by a Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force in Iraq that took place before the publicized behaviors at Abu Ghraib came to light. Additionally, the report noted that personnel in this SMU Task Force introduced battlefield interrogation techniques that included abusive tactics such as sleep deprivation, stress positions, the use of dogs, and the use of Survival Escape Resistance and Evasion techniques – techniques designed specifically to imitate tactics by a country that does not comply with Geneva.**

- 76. Do you believe that such techniques contribute and are appropriate in the struggle against terrorism?**

I am not directly familiar with this report, however, I believe that all U.S. Armed Forces have to comply with applicable law and policy regarding the treatment of detainees.

**77. What is your understanding about how battlefield interrogation techniques by such units were authorized and monitored?**

I am not directly familiar with what policies or procedures were in force at the time that these SMUs operated. I believe, however, that DoD policy would have required that all interrogation tactics conform with those described in Army Field Manual 34-52 and any applicable specific rules of engagement issued by the Secretary of Defense.

**78. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that our Special Operations Forces understand the necessity of complying with the Geneva Conventions when detaining and interrogating those individuals under U.S. control?**

I would ensure that all policies and guidance that we develop for SOF forces are consistent with broader detainee policy, and would coordinate with the Office of Detainee Affairs on policy guidance that I believed would affect detainee treatment.

**79. What steps would you take to ensure that those foreign forces *trained* by our Special Operations Forces understand the same necessity?**

As part of such training, our Special Operations Forces always indicate that further military assistance and training is predicated on such foreign forces adherence to the law of war.

## **CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**80. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes, I will appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress when called upon to do so.

**81. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict?**

Yes, I will provide this Committee or members of this Committee accurate and appropriate information to the best of my ability when called upon to do so.

- 82. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

Yes, I will provide the necessary information to this Committee and other appropriate Committees and their staff when asked to do so.

- 83. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes, I will provide the Committee the necessary documents when appropriate and will consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing documents.